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Me Lexico has been making important
progress on several economic fronts,
moving toward less inflation, increased
reliance on privately owned capital and
companies, and greater integration of its
economy with those of other nations. At
times of transition such as this, there are
many choices to be made. There is also
less resistance to change. That puts Mex-
ico in a position to select policies and
shape institutions that will affect its pros-
perity for decades to come.
The key mechanism underlying this prog-
ress is the nation's increased reliance on
market forces and institutions. This shift
in economic philosophy has enhanced
Mexico's attractiveness to foreign inves-
tors while unleashing more of the crea-
tive abilities of its own entrepreneurs.
The result is that the country is now on a
path toward greater economic efficiency
and prosperity.
Mexico has also made important im-
provements in its approach to trade
over the last few years. As a new mem-
ber of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, it is undertaking to comply
with international standards for the con-
duct of foreign trade. Furthermore, the
Mexican government has implemented
a dramatic unilateral reduction of trade
barriers and was a major catalyst be-
hind the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
Most recently, Mexican authorities have
launched an initiative to provide auton-
omy for the nation's central bank. If their
effort is successful, it will greatly improve
the prospects for price stability and sus-
tainable economic growth.
Thus, Mexico is standing on the thresh-
old of decisions about international com-
merce and central banking that will have
a profound effect on its future.
• Outlook for NAFTA
I strongly support NAFTA and am hope-
ful that the U.S. Congress will enact the
legislation necessary to implement it as
scheduled on January 1,1994.1 believe
that by encouraging free trade in goods,
reducing barriers to trade in services, and
easing limitations on international invest-
ment, the accord will enhance competi-
tion, efficiency, and productivity and
thereby increase the prosperity of all
three North American nations.
There are some groups in the United
States that fear the additional competi-
tion NAFTA would bring about, and
they are lobbying vigorously for its de-
feat. Opponents recently won a deci-
sion in a U.S. district court that re-
quires federal officials to prepare an
environmental impact statement esti-
mating the agreement's likely effect on
such things as air and water quality.'
Initial reports said that the study would
take months to compile and that it would
have to be completed before NAFTA-
related legislation could be sent to Congress
— a delay that would represent a serious
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cently, administration officials have
stated that the legislation can be submit-
ted prior to completion of the study
and that the study could be ready in 45
to 60 days. Nevertheless, the admini-
stration plans to appeal the decision and
believes that the lower court's ruling will
be overturned.
Despite the current uncertainty surround-
ing NAFTA's fate in the United States, I
believe that Mexico can be clear about
what decision it will make. Reductions in
barriers to trade and investment do not
have to be reciprocated to be valuable.
Most of the added prosperity Mexico is
now enjoying stems from its recent uni-
lateral moves toward a more open econ-
omy. Even if the United States fails to en-
act NAFTA, Mexico can, if it wishes,
choose to implement the provisions on its
own, setting an example for its neighbors
in Central, North, and South America and
reaping the rewards that are available to
any nation with the wisdom and the will
to reduce its interference with commerce.
Just as Mexico's decisions on NAFTA
will have a substantial impact on the
country's future prosperity, so too will
its actions regarding the Banco de Mex-
ico's charter.
• A Central Bank's Charter
and National Prosperity
The ability of a central bank to perform
its functions depends on many things,
one of the most important of which is
the bank's charter. By charter, I mean
the laws and practices that specify the
bank's goals and establish its relation-
ship to the legislative and executive
branches of government.
The most important function of a central
bank is to stabilize prices. Price stability
is necessary because it eliminates the
need for households and firms to use real
resources to forecast inflation and to
hedge against losses (and seek gains)
caused by inflation-induced redistribu-
tions of income and wealth. It also in-
creases the clarity with which changes in
relative prices can be discerned, helping
firms to make better decisions about pro-
duction and investment and helping
households to make better decisions
about consumption patterns. In these
ways, price stability raises not only the
level of real economic output, but also
the growth rate of output.
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Because a central bank determines the
price level, or the value of money, its
charter should make it effectively inde-
pendent of the legislative and executive
branches of government. This doesn't
mean that the bank should not be held
accountable for achieving price stabil-
ity, nor does it mean that its independ-
ence should be irrevocable. Clear ob-
jectives and accountability for attaining
them would help to ensure independ-
ence of action. Central bankers should
have enough freedom from government
interference to allow them to choose
and implement monetary policy for a sub-
stantial length of time without concern
that their authority will be rescinded.
There are two reasons why central bank
independence is important. First, elected
officials of any nation may resort to
monetary stimulus of the economy to re-
spond to purely political considerations,
including their own reelection, regardless
of the long-run implications. Certainly,
any government that can spend money
created by a central bank will be tempted
to do so to please voters in the months
preceding an election.
The disadvantage of expanding the
money supply in this way is that it will
eventually lead to inflation, and infla-
tion hurts the economy in the long run.
There is a correlation between inflation
rates and the degree of control that gov-
ernments have over the creation of
money. Countries with independent cen-
tral banks tend to have less inflation than
those whose central banks are closely
controlled by the government.
The second reason that independence
is important is to prevent the govern-
ment from using central bank credit as
a substitute for taxing or borrowing from
the public to finance its expenditures.
This is especially true in countries that
do not have efficient tax collection sys-
tems or strong financial markets. Taxes
make the cost of government expendi-
tures more explicit to the public, which
can lead a nation to wiser use of its lim-
ited resources. In countries with a weak
or inefficient system of tax collection,
central bank financing can be used as a
crutch to avoid the need to develop bet-
ter procedures. Borrowing from the pub-
lic rather than from the central bank makes
the cost of borrowing more explicit, be-
cause the government will have to pay a
market-determined rate of interest.
In addition to independence, the central
bank's charter should specify the goals
it is to pursue and designate which
among them should be given top prior-
ity. I have come to believe that price-
level stability should be a central bank's
primary objective. It is, after all, the
only goal likely to be achievable.
It would be nice to be able to pursue
price stability, full employment, rapid
economic growth, a stable exchange
rate, and low interest rates simultane-
ously. However, in the short run some
of these objectives are likely to be in-
consistent with price stability, and that
is when it is critical for monetary policy-
makers to know that preserving the pur-
chasing power of the currency is their
first obligation. In the long run, price-
level stability is not only consistent
with full employment, maximum sus-
tainable growth, and low interest rates,
but it makes a significant contribution
to their achievement. Indeed, it is the
most important contribution the central
bank can make.This is not to say that price stability en-
sures the attainment of those other wor-
thy goals. Many government policies,
as well as other internal and external
conditions, help to determine a nation's
unemployment rate, growth rate, and
interest rates. The central bank cannot
ensure prosperity. What it can do, by
achieving price stability, is to be sure
that it is not an obstacle to national eco-
nomic growth.
• Independence Is No Substitute for
Clear Objectives and Accountability
The U.S. central bank is structured in a
way that appears to give it substantial in-
dependence. Although governors of the
Federal Reserve System are appointed by
the President of the United States, they
serve 14-year staggered terms, and there
is no direct government involvement in
the appointment of the 12 district bank
presidents.
This is not an oversight. The writers of
the Federal Reserve Act set out to design
a central bank that would be largely insu-
lated from political pressures. Subsequent
revisions to the Act, particularly those
passed in 1935, have served only to in-
crease that insulation. Congress has
often considered proposals to revise the
Federal Reserve System, but has essen-
tially made no change in its structure for
nearly 60 years.
The absence of direct government in-
put into the selection of Reserve Bank
presidents is a key issue in the current
debate about the Fed's accountability
and independence. Some recent propos-
als would require direct government in-
volvement in their selection or would
rescind their authority to vote in mone-
tary policymaking meetings of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC).
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That approach seeks to make the Federal
Reserve more accountable to the current
government. In contrast, I believe that the
Fed should be accountable for achieving
a specific objective, namely, preserving
the purchasing power of the dollar. In-
deed, accountability for achieving a spe-
cific goal may be more important than
independence.
Although the U.S. inflation rate was
fairly low during most of the 1950s
and early 1960s, it increased dramati-
cally from 1965 to 1980. Despite a
marked reduction in the rate since then,
inflation still rose throughout the 1980s
at an average pace that would double
the price level every 14 to 18 years.
Today, surveys show that most Ameri-
cans expect a 3 to 4 percent inflation
rate over the next year or two.
The reason for this uneven and some-
times unsatisfactory inflation perform-
ance in the presence of apparent Federal
Reserve independence is that the govern-
ment has assigned multiple objectives to
the central bank, but it has not given any
one of them top priority. This ambiguity
has resulted in shifting objectives in re-
sponse to changes in economic theories
and political imperatives.
In the 1960s, the Federal Reserve re-
sponded to the Keynesian view that
monetary policy and fiscal policy should
be coordinated and used to fine-tune the
economy into a state of continuous
growth. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, monetary policy also sought to de-
fend U.S. gold reserves and the interna-
tional value of the dollar. After the gold
window was closed in 1971 and fixed ex-
change rates were abandoned in 1973,
the use of monetary policy for counter-
cyclical purposes led to ever-increasing
rates of inflation. By late 1979, inflation
had become so virulent that the Federal
Reserve shifted its attention to reining it
in, an effort that has benefited from the
backing, or at least the tolerance, of
elected officials through much of the pe-
riod since then. However, because many
officials now consider inflation to be un-
der control, there is a risk that political
pressure increasingly will seek to direct
monetary policy to the achievement of
goals other than price stability. The ambi-
guity of multiple goals thus might again
deny monetary policy the anchor it needs
to avoid being pushed by changing politi-
cal tides toward the reefs of what are, for
monetary policy, unachievable and there-
fore inappropriate objectives.
In contrast to the situation in the United
States, the laws governing the central
banks of Germany and New Zealand
specify that price stability is to be given
first priority whenever any other objec-
tive conflicts with it. In its move to-
ward a new central bank charter, Mexi-
co appears to be following these nations'
lead. Price-level stability, if attained,
would contribute to exchange-rate stabil-
ity between the peso and the currencies
of nations that are achieving substantial
price-level stability of their own.
• A New Charter
for the Banco de Mexico
Last May 17, Mexican President Car-
los Salinas de Gortari proposed a con-
stitutional amendment that would sub-
stantially alter the Banco de Mexico's
charter. The amendment was approved
by the required two-thirds majority of
the legislature in June.10
The most important provisions of the
amendment are as follows: The bank will
be responsible for its own administration.
It will be governed by a board of direc-
tors who are appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. The direc-
tors will exercise their duties independ-
ently and can be removed from office
only if convicted of a serious crime. The
primary objective of the bank will be to
maintain the national currency's purchas-
ing power. The government will no
longer be able to compel the central bank
to provide financing to the government
or to anyone else.
The amendment does not spell out how
many directors will constitute the govern-
ing board, how long their terms of office
will be, or whether their terms will be
staggered. These details, which are still
being negotiated and which will need to
be specified in additional legislation, will
help to determine the extent of the central
bank's independence.Furthermore, the amendment does not
specify what "maintaining the purchas-
ing power of the currency" means. Does
it mean international purchasing power,
as indicated, perhaps, by the peso's ex-
change rate against the U.S. dollar,
some other currency, or a basket of cur-
rencies; or does it mean domestic pur-
chasing power, as indicated, perhaps,
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)?
How much annual change in purchas-
ing power is to be considered stability:
0 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent? One
might argue that 10 percent is stability,
compared to some previous changes in
the exchange rate and the CPI, yet at
that rate the currency would lose half
its purchasing power in about seven
years. Should the effects of extraordi-
nary events on the CPI or the exchange
rate be ignored? These questions are
important because ambiguity in the
goal will make it harder to resist politi-
cal pressures for inflationary policies.
Banco de Mexico President Miguel
Mancera explained the need for central
bank autonomy three years ago, when he
noted: "Politicians are subjected to many
pressures to spend liberally, which they
simply cannot often resist, even though
in many cases they are fully aware of the
consequences of excessive spending.
This inability to exercise the necessary re-
straint seems to be a justification for an
independent central bank.,,12
Some observers in the United States have
said that the reason Mexico should legis-
late central bank autonomy is to reassure
foreign investors that it will not revert to
inflationary policies during the next presi-
dential term. It seems to me, however,
that such reassurance will also make an
impression on domestic investors. More-
over, if central bank autonomy and the
mandate to preserve the purchasing
power of the peso lead to stable prices,
the economy will benefit in all of the
ways I have already discussed.
• The Changing Role of Central
Banks in Other Nations
Mexico's move toward a central bank
with greater independence and a mandate
to preserve the currency's purchasing
power should increase the likelihood of a
better inflation performance. That has
been the experience of other countries
that have traveled a similar path. More-
over, the European Community (EC) has
endorsed the concept of central bank in-
dependence as a necessary step toward
price stability and monetary union, and
several of its members are moving in that
direction.
New Zealand is a prime example of a
country that has made recent changes in
the charter of its central bank in an effort
to stabilize prices. Prior to passage of The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of
1989, the monetary authorities were in-
structed to pursue several objectives at
once. Not surprisingly, the nation had
high and variable rates of inflation: From
1971 through 1987, annual consumer in-
flation ranged from 6 to 17 percent and
averaged 12.7 percent. Now, inflation has
fallen to near zero.
Under the new charter, price stability is
specified as the central bank's primary
objective. Moreover, the governor of
the bank and the Minister of Finance
have an explicit employment contract,
called the Policy Targets Agreement,
that specifies a target range for infla-
tion. Currently, that range is zero to 2
percent year-over-year consumer price
inflation. If actual inflation exceeds the
target, the Finance Minister must either
take public responsibility for the out-
come or dismiss the governor.
The Bank of Canada also has improved
that nation's inflation figures recently.
Although the bank is legally under the
control of the Minister of Finance, it
has apparently been able to make a de
facto change in its charter by publicly
announcing that price stability is its
sole objective. This posture seems to
have given the bank freedom to pursue
that objective free from government in-
terference, at least for the present. In
1992, Canada's inflation rate dropped
to less than 2 percent, well below the
U.S. rate and under 4 percent for the
first time in many years.
Germany's central bank, the Bundes-
bank, has a legislated mandate to make
price stability its number-one priority.
That probably explains why from 1962
to 1991, Germany had only half as
much inflation as the United States.
And in France, the new center-right
government recently proposed legisla-
tion to free the central bank from gov-
ernment control. In issuing the pro-
posal, the Minister of the Economy,
Mr. Edmond Alphandery, said that
"those countries which enjoy the great-
est monetary stability are those which
have entrusted the conduct of monetary
policy to an independent central
bank." It is noteworthy that France
is pursuing this course even though in-
flation there has been relatively low in
recent years.
The French proposal, announced in May,
provides for the monetary policy of the
Bank of France to be determined by a
nine-member committee dominated by
people appointed for nine-year terms.
Such long terms of office are intended to
give committee members freedom to go
against the government's wishes, a tech-
nique that parallels the U.S. approach.
The effort to release the Bank of France
from government control was neces-
sary to bring the nation into alignment
with the Maastricht Treaty. That agree-
ment, negotiated by the EC, is a blue-
print for member countries to achieve
full monetary union by the end of the
decade. The treaty requires all EC
countries to have independent central
banks as a step toward establishing an
independent European central bank,
which will also have price stability as
its primary goal. Belgium complied
last March, and it is likely that some
other nations will soon do likewise.14
Thus, Mexico joins the ranks of several
forward-looking countries that have
changed, or are in the process of chang-
ing, their central bank's charter to a
form that is better designed for the pur-
suit of price-level stability. The avail-
able evidence suggests that if Mexicofollows through on its current initia-
tive, it should be easier to stabilize the
purchasing power of its currency.
• Conclusion
The greater the freedom with which mar-
kets are permitted to operate, the better
the job they can do of releasing people's
creative energies. Mexico is making sig-
nificant progress in this area by relaxing
its restrictions on international trade, on in-
vestment, and on the private operation of
businesses. Some of the benefit of those
changes is already visible in the nation's
increasing standard of living. Additional
gains will result if Mexico implements
NAFTA's provisions, regardless of
whether the United States does the same.
Stabilizing the price level is critical be-
cause it improves the efficiency of the
economy and encourages investment,
which together can raise the level and
the growth rate of real output. Mexico
is making great strides in this direction,
not only through recent actions that
have reduced the inflation rate to single
digits for the first time in two decades,
but more important, through its efforts
to institutionalize both central bank in-
dependence and a mandate for the bank
to maintain the purchasing power of
the peso.
Free markets and price stability are re-
lated themes because each contributes
significantly to the achievement of pros-
perity. Mexico is making important prog-
ress on both fronts, for which the nation
is to be commended — and envied.
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Here, President Jordan lays out his
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should be judged on its ability to predict
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nate the uncertainties of the marketplace,
their real contribution lies in providing a
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over the last few years, and despite its
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cisions conditioned on the belief that
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ture than it is today. In this article,
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Compliance with current regulatory re-
quirements in the banking industry en-
tails significant costs that reduce the
efficiency of the financial system and
thus the real growth potential of the
economy at large. In this Economic
Commentary, President Jordan out-
lines a four-point program to refocus
bank regulation to a market-based sys-
tem that would result in improved bank
safety, soundness, and stability, with
less dependence on the federal finan-
cial safety net.
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of Trade Restraints
April 15, 1993
Economists advocate free trade not be-
cause private markets function per-
fectly, but because the alternative, allo-
cating resources through the political
arena, poses a far greater threat to indi-
vidual freedom and economic perform-
ance than do market imperfections.
Here, President Jordan expounds on
this idea, explaining that only free
trade has the potential to enhance the
welfare of all nations simultaneously.
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